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Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local gov-
ernments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus
connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public
resources. Using plausibly-exogenous declines in the power of congressional represen-
tation, we show that the effect is causal. To better understand why connected local
governments can reduce stewardship, we study electoral characteristics. Our findings
suggest that the increased resources that come with powerful congressional represen-
tation allow local-government officials to reduce stewardship without material adverse
effects on their reelection prospects. In sum, our findings provide evidence of a cost
of political connections: they weaken local governments’ incentives to act in a socially
optimal manner.
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1 Introduction
US local governments (i.e., cities and counties) oversee substantial resources that they use to
provide essential public services such as water, sanitation, emergency response, roads, and
education.1 Ineffective management of these resources can have adverse effects on local citi-
zens’ welfare and local economic development (Wolfensohn, 1996; Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011).
Thus, it is important to understand the factors that affect local governments’ stewardship,
which we define as their efforts to oversee and appropriately deploy public resources.
One factor that can affect a local government’s stewardship is the power of its represen-
tation in Congress (i.e., its political connectedness).2 Members of Congress maximize their
chances of reelection by channeling federal resources and policy benefits to their constituents
(Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). As a member rises to power in Congress, the magnitude and
breadth of the benefits that they allocate to their constituency grows, directly and indirectly
increasing the resources available to local governments within the constituency (e.g., Cohen
et al. (2011)). This surplus of resources could influence local governments’ governance ef-
forts. In this paper, we examine whether and how local government stewardship changes in
the presence of powerful congressional representation.
Ex ante, the effect of powerful congressional representation on local governments’ stew-
ardship is unclear. On the one hand, stewardship may be weaker when the local government
is connected to powerful congressional members. Preferential access to federal resources and
1Commensurate with their important role, local governments were responsible for spending over $1.5
trillion of government funds in 2015. To put this amount into perspective, consider that in the same year,
US federal government revenues were approximately $3.4 trillion.
2Local governments are “politically connected” to members of Congress in the sense that they both














This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
the resulting improvement in the quality of services for local citizens could decrease vot-
ers’ attention to stewardship. In turn, reduced voter attention to stewardship can reduce
both local government officials’ incentives to supply stewardship and congressional members’
incentives to demand stewardship from their connected local governments.
On the other hand, local governments’ stewardship may be stronger when the govern-
ment is connected to powerful congressional members. These local governments are likely
subject to greater scrutiny in the form of government audits and media attention. Higher
quality stewardship reduces negative publicity and political challengers’ ability to argue that
incumbent politicians are misusing resources (Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen, 2008).
Our basic concept of stewardship is the proper oversight and use of public funds. To
operationalize this concept, we introduce a novel measure of stewardship. The Governmental
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) highlights that financial and control system audits help
local governments demonstrate “accountability to constituents, including stewardship over
public resources.” In this spirit, we measure stewardship as the first principal component of
five metrics from local governments’ audits.3
Using a sample of 56,042 observations between 1999 and 2016 that represent 7,166 unique
local governments, we show that local governments’ stewardship declines in the presence of
powerful congressional representation. In economic terms, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the strength of a local government’s representation on the most influential congressional
committees correlates with a 1.8 to 2.6 percent decline in each of the five components of
3The five metrics are: 1) an unmodified audit opinion; 2) no material weakness in control systems; 3) no
significant deficiency in control systems; 4) no material non-compliance with applicable laws and regulations;
and 5) the speed with which the auditor completes the audit. The coefficient of interest is similar in magnitude













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
stewardship.4
To establish causality, we use powerful politicians’ unexpected departures from Congress
(due to either sudden death or cabinet appointment) that dramatically decrease the power
of connected local governments’ representation in Congress. The sudden departure of a
powerful member reduces the federal benefits available to local governments in their district
(or state) and increases these governments’ incentives to improve oversight of their more
limited resources. We show that following an unexpected departure, connected local govern-
ments improve the stewardship of their resources. The evidence indicates that the power of
congressional representation causally affects local governments’ stewardship.
We also investigate channels through which the inverse relationship between stewardship
and powerful congressional representation can manifest. In particular, reduced stewardship
in the presence of a powerful connection could be driven by intentional, nefarious efforts by
local government officials to misappropriate funds for personal gain. It could also be driven
by ineptitude, leading to the unintentional misuse of funds. Our cross-sectional evidence is
consistent with misappropriation; we find that the negative link between powerful congres-
sional representation and local governments’ stewardship attenuates in areas with a limited
history of corruption.
Our study also provides insights into the role of elections in motivating local governments
to provide stewardship. We previously discussed that a negative relation between steward-
ship and powerful congressional representation could be driven by reduced voter attention
to stewardship. We support this explanation by showing that the negative relation atten-
4We present economic significance using the individual components of local government stewardship
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uates in politically competitive electorates. In these electorates, political challengers and
the media are more likely to scrutinize the incumbent politician’s effectiveness in managing
local government resources. Therefore, voters in politically competitive areas are less likely
to reduce their attention to stewardship in the presence of a powerful congressional member.
Next, we study election outcomes to better understand whether local government officials
have election-related incentives to influence stewardship. We find that although stewardship
correlates positively with local officials’ vote share, congressional power and federal resources
directed to the local area are more strongly correlated with local officials’ vote share.5 This
finding suggests that local officials can reduce their supply of stewardship, and instead rely
on the benefits of powerful congressional representation, without material adverse effects on
their reelection prospects.6
Our study is relevant to the academic literature examining political connections, for
several reasons. First, we show a cost of political connections, whereas prior studies generally
show the benefits.7 Second, we provide evidence about a largely unexplored type of “political
connection” that manifests through the representation of shared constituents. In particular,
5These election tests rely on the sub-sample of local governments for which local election data is available,
and the results should not be interpreted causally.
6We also study congressional members’ election outcomes. We find that the stewardship of local gov-
ernments in their constituencies is uncorrelated with congressional members’ vote share. Thus, members of
Congress do not appear to have election-based incentives to demand stewardship from local governments
within their districts and states. Instead, our findings suggest that powerful congressional members can rely
on their ability to allocate resources to their constituents to obtain reelection.
7Researchers have shown that corporate political connections are associated with higher profitability
(Amore and Bennedsen, 2013) and receipt of government contracts (Tahoun, 2014), reduced likelihood of
facing IRS tax audits and SEC investigations for financial misconduct (Hunter and Nelson, 1995; Correia,
2014), higher firm-specific investment (Wellman, 2017), more favorable accounting standard setting outcomes
(Ramanna, 2008), greater propensity to hire a Big N auditor (Guedhami et al., 2014), financing choices
(Tahoun and van Lent, 2018), and better merger antitrust review outcomes (Mehta et al., 2020). Two
papers that document costs of political connections are (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) and (Bertrand
et al., 2018). (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) show that politically connected firms make financing decisions
that are potentially suboptimal in the long-run. (Bertrand et al., 2018) show that connected firms misuse
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local government officials and members of Congress each advance their political success by
ensuring their shared constituents are satisfied. Third, our paper draws attention to the idea
that a range of organizations are affected by political connections. By contrast, prior studies
have largely focused on the effects of political connections for corporations. We are the first
to provide evidence about the effects of powerful political connections in the context of US
local governments.
Our study highlights room for improvement in the stewardship over public resources at
the local government level, despite recent reports that show the US is in the bottom 10
percent of corrupt countries8. As such, the study is relevant to the literature examining
state and local government reporting and governance choices (e.g., Zimmerman 1977; Gore
2004; Beck 2018).9 Our findings complement this literature by showing a distinct channel –
powerful representation in Congress – that adversely affects local governments’ governance
efforts.
2 Background and data
The United States is comprised of 3,142 counties and 19,492 municipalities. These local
governments are responsible for managing the resources that are required to provide a broad
range of public services.
8Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2017.
9Our study particularly complements recent papers that focus on the political determinants of gover-
nance characteristics. For instance, Kido et al. (2012) find that election-related incentives are positively
associated with state governments’ accounting manipulation. Naughton et al. (2015) show that politicians
use accounting discretion to mask the size of pension deficits during periods of fiscal stress. Gore (2015)
finds that governments obscure the number of resources available in the presence of strong labor unions and
Cuny (2016) shows that politically-competitive county governments are more likely to withhold negative
news than those that are not politically competitive. Costello et al. (2017) find that state governments
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2.1 Stewardship
We follow Merriam-Webster and define stewardship as “the careful and responsible manage-
ment of something entrusted to one’s care.” In the context of local governments, steward-
ship refers to whether officials carefully manage their resources for the benefit of citizens.
Although this is an important issue, limited large-sample empirical evidence exists about
the determinants of local stewardship. One possible reason for this lack of evidence is that
local stewardship is difficult to measure. We overcome this measurement challenge by using
audit outcomes.
2.1.1 Local Governments and Single Audits
To assure stakeholders that public funds are properly managed, all entities receiving over
$750,000 of direct federal allocations are required to undergo an annual Single Audit. We
describe the Single Audit in detail in Appendix B. The results of the Single Audit must be
reported to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse within nine months of the fiscal year-end.10
To provide a sense of the type of information contained in the audit reports, Appendix
C provides examples of detailed adverse findings from several audit reports filed in 2016.11
The city of Petersburg, Virginia’s expenditures exceeded appropriations. The city of Eliza-
beth, New Jersey did not report several large sub-awards from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. The city of Oxnard, California received a qualified audit opinion
because the auditors were unable to obtain sufficient audit evidence to support the capital
10Although the audit results are required to be made public, there is no similar requirement for the
underlying financial statements during our sample period. Therefore, only the audit outcomes are easily
observable for a large set of local governments.
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asset balances and the related depreciation expense. These examples help to illustrate that
adverse audit outcomes demonstrate a lack of stewardship over public resources.
The Federal Audit Clearinghouse maintains a Single Audit database, in which the results
of Single Audits are available to the public. The database includes the following relevant
information: the fiscal year-end, the date of the audit report, the entity’s direct federal
expenditures, the identity of the auditor, the outcome of the auditor’s risk assessment of the
auditee, the audit opinion for the financial statement and compliance audits, and whether
the auditor identified a material weakness or significant deficiency for each audit. We use
these measures to evaluate stewardship of funds because of the breadth of coverage, the long
time-series, and the availability of the data.
We identify all US cities and counties (entity types 100 and 200) in the Single Audit
database for all years between 1999 and 2016. Next, we identify auditee ZIP Codes for each
local government in the Single Audit database. The US Census provides ZIP Code level
mapping to congressional districts.12 We use this mapping to match each local government
observation to a congressional district. We remove all local governments that report ZIP
Codes that cross congressional district boundaries. Our final sample consists of 56,042 local
government-year observations across 7,166 unique local governments.13
We collect all the financial statement audit outcome variables available in the Single
Audit database that in aggregate, measure stewardship. First, we create an indicator that
equals one if local government g ’s auditor issues an unmodified audit opinion on the year
t financial statements (i.e., no adverse, qualified, or disclaimed opinion) and zero otherwise
12The ZIP Code mapping dataset is from https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/.
13The sample of 7,166 unique local governments represents approximately one-third of the cities and coun-
ties in the US. The remaining local governments do not receive enough direct federal funding to participate
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(No_ModOpiniong,t). Panel A of Table 1 shows that 88 percent of government years are
characterized by an unmodified audit opinion.
Second, we create an indicator equal to one for the 76 percent of government years
in which the auditor does not identify a material weakness in the internal controls over
financial reporting (No_MatWeaknessg,t). Third, we create an indicator equal to one for the
63 percent of government years in which the auditor does not identify a significant deficiency
in the internal controls over financial reporting (No_SigDeficiencyg,t).14 Fourth, we create
an indicator equal to one for the 91 percent of government years in which the auditor does
not identify material noncompliance with the laws or regulations imposed by states, federal
agencies, and bondholders (No_NonComplianceg,t). Fifth, the time lag between period-
end and the date of the audit report is divided by 365 and multiplied by negative one, so
that higher values represent higher quality (Timelinessg,t). The time-series variation in this
measure captures the extent of problems the auditor encounters in the course of completing
the audit. The average audit is completed 259 days after fiscal year-end.
To create a summary measure of local stewardship, Stewardshipg,t , we take the first prin-
cipal component of these five measures.15 Panel B of Table 1 illustrates that these variables
14A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls such that
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s financial statements will not be
prevented, or detected and corrected in a timely basis. A significant deficiency in internal controls is less
severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those charged with governance.
We treat these internal control outcomes as separate because 18 percent of our government-year observations
are characterized by both a significant deficiency and a material weakness. Nonetheless, our results remain
significant at the 1 percent level when we measure the internal control outcomes (material weaknesses and
significant deficiencies) as a single ordinal variable.
15Audit outcomes in the governmental sector differ from those in the public sector along two important
dimensions. First, internal control weaknesses are more common in governments than in firms. While 24
percent of our sample has internal control weaknesses, Ge et al. (2017) find that only 10 percent of small firms
(i.e., firms with a public float of less than $75 million) disclose internal control weaknesses over an eight-year
window between 2007 and 2014. Second, governmental audit findings are less sticky. As part of the Single
Audit, governments respond to each audit finding and develop a plan for remediation. Moreover, repeat
findings are highlighted as such, which illustrates the emphasis on correction. Indeed, 31 percent of our
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are strongly correlated with one another. Material weaknesses and significant deficiencies are
the strongest determinants of Stewardshipg,t . However, the correlations between the com-
ponents of Stewardshipg,t are imperfect, which indicates these constructs capture distinct
elements of local governments’ stewardship.
To provide some context for how Stewardship varies around the US, Table 2 ranks the
50 states by the average level of Stewardship, from highest to lowest. Local governments
in Washington, Oregon, and Delaware demonstrate the strongest average Stewardship. By
contrast, the local governments in West Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi demonstrate
the weakest Stewardship, as measured by aggregating the Single Audit variables.
To alleviate concerns about the sensitivity of our tests to our primary measure, we also
consider each component of Stewardship individually.16 Moreover, Internet Appendix A
describes three additional alternative measures and presents results using each of them as
our proxy for stewardship. First, we create a summary measure that sums together the
components of Stewardship. Second, we examine the outcomes of compliance audits that
are specific to the federal funds directly allocated to a local government. Third, we con-
struct a search-based measure of stewardship that counts news articles that mention a local
government’s corrupt behavior each year.
2.2 Congressional Representation
A well-developed literature in political economy shows that members of Congress support
their constituencies in various ways, including projects, programs, grants, earmarks, and
or No_NonCompliance.
16For example, principal component analysis was developed for continuous variables and may not be ideally
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allocations. More powerful members of Congress have a greater ability to support their
constituency. This ability stems from two sources: seniority and membership on powerful
congressional committees. Levitt and Poterba (1999) argue that senior committee members
can determine a committee’s actions and have the greatest ability to allocate federal gov-
ernment resources to their constituencies. They find that federal expenditures positively
correlate with congressional seniority. However, Edwards and Stewart III (2006) find that
not all committees are equally influential. Cohen et al. (2011) corroborate this idea and show
that serving on relatively powerful committees increases congressional members’ ability to
direct federal resources to their states and districts.
2.2.1 Congressional Representation Data
Following prior work, we measure the strength of a local government’s representation in
Congress based on the seniority of related House members and Senators that serve on the
10 most powerful committees in each chamber. We also present results for the top 1, top 3,
and top 5 committees, to be consistent with Cohen et al. (2011). We base the determination
of the top 10 committees on the methodology from Edwards and Stewart III (2006).17 They
use transfers to each congressional committee as a proxy for committee power rankings. For
instance, a member of Congress switching from committee A to committee B means that
the congressional member values the latter more highly than the former. The demand for a
given committee is the proxy for that committee’s power.18
17Members of Congress serving on non-top 10 committees are also likely to have opportunities to channel
federal resources to their constituencies. However, attempts to identify the most powerful of these other
committees would be arbitrary.
18The 10 most powerful Senate committees using this method are Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropria-
tions, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce. Similarly,
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We use congressional data from Professor Charles Stewart III to link House members and
Senators to local governments located within their constituencies. The sample period covers
the 105th Congress to the 114th Congress. We also collect data on the congressional com-
mittee assignments, appointment dates, and departure dates for each member of Congress.
We collect the congressional member’s appointment year in each chamber of Congress to
calculate the member’s relative seniority.
Each local government is connected to three members of Congress (two Senators and one
House Representative). We measure each congressional member’s power as the product of
the member’s tenure in Congress (in years), multiplied by the number of Top X committees
on which the member sits (PolRepX ). X is set to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful
committees. We sum together PolRepX for the local government’s three connected members
of Congress and divide it by 100. We label this variable CongressRepXg,t. Appendix D
provides an example of the CongressRepX calculation for Shelby County, Alabama.
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for CongressRepX. Local governments
in our sample are connected to members of Congress with 63 aggregate years of service
on Top10 committees, 33 years on Top5 committees, 21 years on Top3 committees, and
6 years on Top1 committees. In Internet Appendix A, we consider the effects of powerful
representation on non-top 10 committees and also ensure that our results are robust to
alternative measures of representation.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that representation on powerful committees significantly nega-
tively correlates with Stewardship and its components. Although admittedly anecdotal, the
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recent water crisis in Flint, Michigan provides illustrative evidence of this negative corre-
lation. At the commencement of the crisis in 2014, Flint had a CongressRep1 of 13 and
a CongressRep10 of 96. Both of these values are above the 75th percentile in our sample,
indicating Flint had strong congressional representation in 2014. Flint’s Stewardship was
−0.23 in 2014 and −0.21 in 2015, both below our sample mean of 0.00.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
We estimate the following OLS specification to examine whether changes in local stewardship
of funds are linked to changes in the power of congressional representation:
Stewardshipg,t = α + β1CongressRepXg,t−1 + β2Bondg,t + β3FederalExpg,t
+β4Subsidyg,t + βg + βt + εg,t
(1)
where Stewardshipg,t measures local government g ’s stewardship in year t. CongressRepXg,t-1
measures the power of congressional representation in year t-1, and is equal to one of Con-
gressRep1, CongressRep3, CongressRep5, or CongressRep10.
Because bond issuances can influence stewardship incentives, we collect data on local
government bond issuances that occur during our sample period from the Thomson-Reuters
SDC Platinum database. We hand-match the data from Thomson Reuters to the Single
Audit database by local government name using the issuer’s (auditee’s) name, state, city,
and ZIP Code. Bondg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government g issues a new bond
in year t.
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attempt to maximize their chances of reelection by ensuring that federal resources and policy
benefits are channeled to their constituents (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). Although
we cannot empirically observe all of the federal benefits that can accrue at the local level
(e.g., capital projects, programs, grants, earmarks, and favorable federal policies), we obtain
data on two potential benefits for a large sample of local governments during our sample
period. First, we obtain federal expenditures from the Single Audit database. We use these
federal fund allocations (FederalExp) to proxy for direct financial support from the federal
government to local governments. Second, we examine corporate subsidies from the fed-
eral government to local companies to proxy for indirect financial support. Good Jobs First
provides a list of company-specific financial assistance such as grants and tax credits. We ob-
tain each recipient’s headquarters information from COMPUSTAT and aggregate the dollar
amount of corporate subsidies received in each year at the county-level (Subsidy).
These federal allocations can themselves affect local governments’ ability to maintain
stewardship over public resources. Hence, we control for FederalExpg,t and Subsidyg,t in
all regressions. FederalExpg,t is the natural logarithm of directly-allocated federal funds
expended by local government g in year t. Subsidyg,t is the natural logarithm of federal
subsidies to corporations headquartered within the jurisdiction of local government g in year
t. We set government years with missing subsidy data to zero and include an indicator equal
to one if the data is missing in all regressions.
Because the treatment (congressional representation) varies at the district level, standard
errors are clustered by congressional district. We include local government fixed effects and
year fixed effects in all specifications so that we do not need to otherwise control for time-
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3 Results
3.1 Primary Results
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results from the multivariable tests that examine the link
between stewardship and powerful congressional representation. The coefficient on Con-
gressRep1 in Column (1) is negative and statistically significant. This finding is consistent
with the idea that local stewardship of funds weakens in the presence of senior congressional
representation on powerful committees. The evidence in Columns (2) through (4) supports
this finding across representation on Top3, Top5, and Top10 congressional committees.
Economically interpreting these coefficients is difficult because Stewardship is mean-zero.
To provide some insights about the economic effects, Panel B of Table 3 presents our primary
regression results (from Equation (1)), in which we replace Stewardshipg,t with each of the
five components of Stewardshipg,t. In the interest of brevity, we present results for two
of the primary independent variables: CongressRep3 and CongressRep10.19 We find that
a one-standard-deviation increase in the power of congressional representation on a top 3
committee reduces the likelihood of an unmodified audit opinion by 1.8 percent, no material
weakness by 2.3 percent, no significant deficiency by 2.4 percent, no material non-compliance
by 1.8 percent, and report timeliness by 2.6 percent.
In terms of control variables, the coefficient on FederalExp is negative but generally
statistically insignificant, and the coefficient on Subsidy is generally significantly negative,
indicating that additional resources add complexity that can be difficult to manage. In sum,
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the results from Table 3 provide evidence that local governments in the constituencies of
powerful congressional committee members maintain relatively weak stewardship of funds.
3.2 Identification
The evidence provided thus far is associational. Omitted variables, such as local economic
conditions, could exist that jointly determine changes in the power of representation on
powerful committees and changes in a local government’s stewardship of funds. We use
departures from Congress to measure plausibly exogenous declines in representation on pow-
erful congressional committees.
The newly tenured congressional member that takes the seat of a recently-departed pow-
erful member has the lowest seniority ranking and thus the weakest ability to influence
allocations to his or her constituency (e.g., Levitt and Poterba (1999)). Therefore, we ex-
pect local governments within the affected constituency to be more careful with the limited
funds allocated to them (i.e., to improve stewardship).
To ensure that we can attribute changes in stewardship to changes in congressional rep-
resentation, our departure cases need to occur for reasons that are likely uncorrelated with
the factors that affect local stewardship of funds.20 We identify members that depart from
Congress for one of two reasons. First, the member unexpectedly dies while in office. We
define death as unexpected if a member of Congress dies within six months of announcing
20Recent studies impose varying criteria to determine appropriate congressional departure cases. Bertrand
et al. (2018) use the departures of House members that occur because of death, resignation, or primary
defeat to identify variation in corporations’ charitable donations within congressional districts. However, in
our setting, poor underlying state or district economic conditions may affect both congressional reelection
prospects and local government incentives to ensure funds are properly used and controlled. Mehta et al.
(2020) use politician transfers from Judiciary committees to more powerful committees to identify variation
in the ability of corporations to obtain political influence. Because committee transfers do not affect a
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an illness. Second, the President appoints the member to a cabinet position that results in
their resignation from Congress. Departures for these two reasons remove the congressional
member’s ability (and incentive) to allocate resources to their constituencies.
Using Factiva and LexisNexis, we identify 21 unexpected death events and two cabi-
net appointments during our sample period.21 In Internet Appendix B, we provide details
for these 23 cases, including the congressional member’s name, chamber of Congress, con-
stituency, year of departure, the reason for departure, and the number of local governments
affected by the departure. In total, the departing congressional members are connected to
695 unique sample local governments.
We create an indicator, DepartXg,t-4 to t-1, equal to one for local governments in the con-
stituency of a congressional member serving on a powerful committee who exogenously de-
parted Congress in the prior four years (i.e., from t-4 to t-1), and zero otherwise. We use
a four-year window because this is the average of the length of Senate terms (6 years) and
House terms (2 years). The value of X indicates whether the departure represents a member
of Congress serving on the top 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful congressional committees. Ap-
proximately 1 percent of our local government years are characterized by the departure of a
Top1 committee member, and 3 percent are characterized by a Top10 committee member’s
departure.
Table 4 presents the regression results. We replace the independent variable of interest
from Equation (1), CongressRepX, with DepartX. A positive coefficient on DepartX indi-
cates that local governments exhibit stronger stewardship after they experience a plausibly
21Our empirical results for the departure tests remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level if we
exclude the two departures due to the cabinet appointments and only use the 23 unexpected death cases.
Our empirical results remain significant at the 1 percent level if we include Hillary Clinton’s 2008 cabinet
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exogenous loss of an influential connection to a powerful congressional committee (and thus
a loss of the benefits that come with powerful representation).
The coefficients on DepartX are all positive and statistically significant.22 This evidence
indicates that declines in the power of congressional representation causally increase local
stewardship. In economic terms, the loss of representation on the top-ranking congressional
committee (i.e., Depart1 ) correlates with a 42 percent improvement in stewardship, relative
to the median level of Stewardship. The loss of representation on a top 10 committee corre-
lates with a 29 percent improvement in stewardship. In sum, local governments within the
constituency of a recently departed congressional member are more careful with the limited
funds allocated to them.
In additional analyses presented in Internet Appendix B, we run our main specification
(Equation 1) using exogenous departures as an instrument for congressional representation.
We find that DepartX is a strong instrument for CongressRepX in three of four specifica-
tions (the Weak Instrument F -statistic ranges from 13.24 to 31.92), and the coefficient on
the instrumented variable in the second stage is statistically significant at the 1 percent level
across all specifications. In sum, the evidence in this section provides support of a causal link
between the power of local governments’ representation in Congress and local government
stewardship.
22In untabulated analyses, we find that our results are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or
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3.3 Potential Channels ThroughWhich Reduced Stewardship Man-
ifests
Our main results show a negative relation between stewardship and the power of congres-
sional representation. This reduction in stewardship is consistent with local government
officials’ intentional misappropriation of public resources, but it is also consistent with inep-
titude, leading to unintentional misuse of funds.
To differentiate between these possibilities, we explore the variation in the local area’s
culture of corruption. If our results vary along this dimension, the reduction in stewardship
is consistent with misappropriation. Therefore, we study two dimensions of corruption that
can be measured at the local level: prevalence of court cases and instances of political fraud.
We collect the number of criminal and civil court filings for each US court district between
1998 and 2017 from the Federal Court Management Statistics.23 Court Casesc is the number
of civil and criminal court cases (in thousands) in county c’s U.S Court District from 1998
to 2017.24 Table 1 shows that the average court district in our sample has 92,630 court cases
over this period.
Next, we follow Parsons et al. (2018) and collect the number of political fraud cases
for each court district between 1998 and 2017 from the US Department of Justice Re-
ports to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.25 DOJ
Enforcementsc is the number of federal, state, and local public officials convicted of a
corruption-related crime in county c’s U.S. Court District from 1998 to 2017. Table 1 shows
23http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-court-management-statistics.
24We assume that because of the variation in the number of court districts across states, the geographic
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that the average court district in our sample has 226.29 DOJ enforcements against public
officials over this period.
Low values along these two dimensions represent relatively lower levels of corruption.26
To examine whether our results vary based on the level of local-area corruption, we interact
CongressRepXg,t-1 from Equation (1) with an indicator, LowCorruptc, that equals one for a
county in the lowest quartile of each of measure. A positive coefficient on the interaction term
indicates that for a given level of powerful congressional representation, local governments
in low corruption environments display better stewardship.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the regression results. In the interest of brevity, we only
present the results for the Top 3 and Top 10 committees.27 The results show that a culture
of anti-corruption at the local level strongly offsets local governments’ propensity to reduce
their stewardship in the presence of powerful congressional representation. The coefficient
on CongressRepX*LowCorrupt is positive and significant in all four columns.
In Columns (1) and (2), the sum of the coefficients on CongressRepX and
CongressRepX*LowCorrupt are not statistically or economically different from zero. This
insignificance indicates that local governments in counties with a limited history of court
cases do not reduce stewardship in the presence of powerful congressional representation.
Similarly, Columns (3) and (4) show that local governments in counties with a limited his-
tory of political fraud do not reduce stewardship in the presence of powerful congressional
representation.
Internet Appendix A provides additional support for the misappropriation of resources.
26Our measures of corruption are time-invariant because they are intended to capture a culture of corrup-
tion in the local area. In Internet Appendix C, we find that our results are qualitatively similar when using
time-varying measures of Court Cases and DOJ Enforecements.
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In particular, we find that our main results are statistically significant at the one (ten) percent
level in 2 out of 4 (1 out of 4) specifications and statistically significant at the ten percent
when we measure stewardship as the count of news articles that mention local governments’
corruption.
We next examine whether ineptitude can explain reduced stewardship in our setting. If
this is the case, our findings should be pronounced among the smallest local governments.
Small governments are the least likely to have adequate resources allocated to their account-
ing systems and personnel. Therefore, those governments are least equipped to handle the
influx of funds that arise from powerful congressional representation.
We obtain the census population data by ZIP Code from incomebyzipcode.com and use
the ZIP Codes from the Single Audit database to link population to the cities and counties
in our sample. We create an indicator equal to one for local governments in the lowest
population quartile, Small.28
Panel B of Table 5 shows that our main results are not pronounced among the smallest
local governments. By contrast, our results attenuate for these small local governments.
This finding refutes the idea that ineptitude can explain the reduction in stewardship. In
sum, the results in this subsection indicate that the negative link between stewardship and
powerful congressional representation is due to local government officials’ misappropriation
of public resources for personal gain.
28The mean of Small is slightly larger than 25 percent because we also identify cities and counties with
missing population information as “Small.” We assume that those governments with missing data are likely
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3.4 Additional Analyses
We undertake several additional analyses related to the link between the power of congres-
sional representation and local stewardship. First, we consider whether the connections
between local officials and congressional members in our setting are personal. These parties
are “connected” in the sense that they both represent the same constituents and thus have
shared political representation. However, in many settings, connections represent personal,
quid-pro-quo relationships between two parties (e.g., Correia (2014); Tahoun and van Lent
(2018)).
The analyses that are tabulated in Internet Appendix D show the connections in our set-
ting are unlikely to be personal. In particular, we find that powerful congressional members
do not protect local officials with low stewardship from prosecution by the Department of
Justice. Furthermore, we find that congressional members provide more direct funding to
local areas to which they are aligned politically rather than to their hometown. Finally, we
find that local governments that improve stewardship are no more likely to receive direct
federal funding than those that do not.
Next, we examine the role of bondholders, auditors, and the media as monitors over local
governments’ stewardship. The findings tabulated in Internet Appendix E indicate that the
presence of bondholders, high-quality auditors, and the media marginally attenuates the like-
lihood that local governments reduce stewardship in the presence of powerful congressional
representation.
We also discuss a battery of robustness results in Internet Appendix F. In short, we ensure
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solely driven by powerful congressional representation on the two appropriations committees,
which have the strongest ability to distribute financial benefits, are not driven by the largest
states, and are similar (albeit at lower significance levels) when we include state-by-year
fixed effects that remove the effects of time-varying state-level characteristics.
4 Mechanism
We examine whether reduced voter attention to stewardship is a possible mechanism that can
explain why the link between powerful congressional representation and local stewardship is
negative. We expect the reduction in stewardship in the presence of powerful congressional
representation to attenuate in local areas that are politically competitive. In these areas,
political challengers and the media are more likely to highlight the incumbent politician’s
ineffectiveness in managing local government resources. Therefore, voters are more likely to
be aware of poor stewardship when political competition is high.
We gather election outcomes at the county-level from the CQ Voting and Elections
dataset. These data are available from 1998 to 2016 and include the number of votes and
party affiliation for each senatorial candidate. We use the closeness of votes at the county
level in Senate elections as our proxy for political competition in the local area. PolCompc,t
is an indicator equal to one if county c’s vote count for the Democratic candidate is within
one percent of the vote count for the Republican candidate in the next senatorial election.
The interaction between CongressRepXg,t-1 and PolCompc,t indicates whether the re-
lationship between powerful congressional representation and stewardship varies with the













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
means that reduced voter attention to stewardship is a mechanism that drives our results.
In particular, a positive coefficient shows that connected local governments are less likely to
reduce stewardship if the local area is politically competitive.
We present the empirical results in Table 6. The coefficients on the interaction term bear
positive and statistically significant signs in three out of four columns. Moreover, the sum of
CongressRepX and the interaction between CongressRepX and PolComp is not significantly
different from zero in any specification, which indicates that local political competition can
fully offset the bad behavior of connected local governments. This offset is consistent with
the idea that reelection concerns mitigate the negative relation between local officials’ efforts
to supply stewardship and the presence of powerful congressional representation.
Our findings above suggest that local government officials have election-related incen-
tives to influence stewardship. In Section 4.1, we examine the role that local-government
stewardship and powerful congressional representation play in local officials’ reelection out-
comes. It is also possible that congressional members’ reelection outcomes are related to the
stewardship of local governments located within their constituencies. Finding evidence of
such a relation would support the idea that members of Congress have reelection-related in-
centives to ensure that the benefits they direct to their constituencies via local governments
are appropriately deployed. We consider this possibility in Section 4.2.
4.1 Local Elections and Stewardship
We obtain local government officials’ election outcomes from OurCampaigns.com. These
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number of votes won, and the total number of votes. We acknowledge that a limitation of
this analysis is that we cannot obtain data for all local government elections. However, our
sample size is comparable to recent studies (e.g., Nakhmurina (2019)). In total, we obtain
data on 4,641 elections that take place during our sample period.
We impose two restrictions on the data. First, we exclude elections that do not include an
incumbent local government official. Second, we carefully examine the titles of incumbent
officials to identify senior local government officials that are likely to be responsible for
stewardship of public resources.29 After applying these restrictions, our final sample includes
1,550 local elections.
Formally, we estimate the following regression:
Share_Localp,g,t = α + β1Reported_Stewardshipg,t−1 + β2CongressRepXg,t−1
+β3Controlsg,t−1 + βt + εg,t
(2)
The dependent variable captures the vote share of the incumbent. Specifically, Share_Localp,g,t
is the proportion of votes won by the incumbent local official p who is part of local govern-
ment g in an election held in year t (Abramowitz, 1988; Cox and Munger, 1989; Krebs,
1998). Reported_Stewardshipg,t-1 is local government g ’s Stewardship reported in the finan-
cial statements filed in the 12-month period immediately preceding local official p’s election
in year t. We measure all other independent variables with a one-period lag from the election
date. Panel A of Table 7 shows that local government officials that seek reelection win an
average of 63 percent of votes.
29Therefore, we only include elections for local government officials with the following titles: Alderman,
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, Mayor, President, or Supervisor. We exclude elections for all other
officials based on our determination that those officials are unlikely to have a material role in the stewardship
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We include three variables to capture the association between powerful congressional
representation and election outcomes. As previously defined, CongressRepXg,t captures the
power of congresssional representation. In this specification, the variable is a proxy for the
range of possible benefits that can be received by a local government for distribution to
constituents. We expect greater benefits to be positively related to the proportion of votes
won by the incumbent.
We also control for the level of two measurable federal resources that can affect citi-
zen’s satisfaction with incumbent local officials: FederalExpg,t and Subsidyg,t. By including
these two measurable federal resources, CongressRepXg,t captures all other possible direct
and indirect benefits that accrue to the local government because of powerful congressional
representation.
To control for other factors that could influence elections, we also control for county-level
political competition (PolCompc,t-1); economic conditions (Incomec,t-1 andUnemploymentc,t-1);
and education levels (Educationc).30 We include year fixed effects to absorb any macro-level
economic events that occur during the year.
We can compare the summary statistics in Panel A of Table 7 to those in Panel A of Table
1 to get a sense for the selection bias in the OurCampaigns.com data. For the sub-sample
of local governments represented in the OurCampaigns.com dataset, political competition
(PolComp) and congressional representation (CongressRepX) are similar to that for the
30PolCompc,t is an indicator equal to one if county c’s vote count for the Democratic candidate is within
one percent of the vote count for the Republican candidate in the next senatorial election Incomec,t is the
natural logarithm of county c’s per-capita income in year t obtained from the BEA (Bureau of Economic
Analysis). Unemploymentc,t is the percentage of the working population in county c that is unemployed in
year t obtained from the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Educationc is the average percentage of the adult
population in county c over the period 2013 to 2017 that has a four-year university degree obtained from
the USDA’s (US Department of Agriculture) Economic Research Service. This variable is time-invariant
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full sample, but Stewardship and federal expenditures (FederalExp) are higher than the
full sample average. Although these statistics do not indicate a particular selection bias, we
nonetheless caution that our results may not generalize to all local elections.
In Column (1), Panel B, of Table 7, we present regression results for Equation 2 that
exclude CongressRepX to minimize the concern that our results are biased due to collinearity
between Stewardship and CongressRepX. We show that Stewardship is positively correlated
with local officials’ vote share. Local voters are more satisfied with the performance of their
local officials when those officials demonstrate strong stewardship. In economic terms, a
one-standard-deviation higher level of stewardship correlates with a 1.4 percentage-point
higher vote share. This correlation further supports the evidence presented in subsection
3.3 that stewardship captures corrupt local spending rather than simply a decision to not
spend money on accounting control systems and civil servants, which are unlikely to be of
first-order importance to voters.
In Columns (2) through (5), we add CongressRepX to the regression.31 The results show
that congressional representation on Top1, Top3, and Top5 committees is statistically more
significantly correlated with local election outcomes than local governments’ stewardship.
In economic terms, congressional representation on Top1 and Top3 committees is an or-
der of magnitude larger than that of Stewardship. A one-standard-deviation higher level of
stewardship correlates with a 1.36 percentage-point higher vote share. By contrast, a one-
standard-deviation higher level of representation on a Top1 (Top3) committee correlates with
a 2.82 percentage-point (2.64 percentage-point) higher vote share.32 F -tests of differences
31The VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) in each of the columns is approximately 4, which indicates that
multicollinearity is unlikely to bias the coefficients.
32These economic magnitudes are similar if we base the calculations on descriptive statistics for the sub-
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between the coefficients indicate that the relation between election outcomes and represen-
tation on Top1, Top3, and Top5 committees is significantly different to that of stewardship.
The coefficients on FederalExp and Subsidy are also positive and statistically signifi-
cant. For example, the coefficient of 0.011 on FederalExp in Column (2) indicates that a
one-standard-deviation increase in federal expenditures correlates with a 1.57 percentage-
point greater vote share. The coefficient of 0.018 on Subsidy indicates that a one-standard-
deviation increase in subsidies correlates with a 4.84 percentage-point larger vote share. The
positive coefficients on these variables, along with that on CongressRepX, indicate that the
benefits of powerful congressional representation are an important aspect of local officials’
reelection prospects. The coefficients on the other control variables are generally consistent
with prior studies.33
In sum, this table provides initial evidence that local officials’ reelection prospects are
related to their level of stewardship. Importantly, although local officials benefit from demon-
strating stewardship over public resources, they enjoy much larger benefits from powerful
congressional representation. This evidence, in conjunction with the evidence presented in
Table 6, shows that local officials can reduce the supply of stewardship, and instead rely on
the benefits of powerful congressional representation, without materially adverse effects on
their reelection prospects.
33Interestingly, the coefficient on Income is negative. A possible explanation for this result is the greater
supply of political challengers who seek to govern wealthy local areas, which increases competition. Another
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4.2 Congressional Elections and Stewardship
We obtain election outcomes for Senators and House Representatives from Charles Stewart’s
website.34 These data comprise election dates, the names of the politicians participating
in the election, the number of votes won, and the total number of votes. We identify all
elections in which an incumbent congressional member participated. In total, there are
2,780 reelection campaign cases during our sample period: 172 Senate elections and 2,608
House elections. We use the election data to construct a vote share variable. In particular,
Share_Congressp,t is the proportion of votes won by the incumbent member of Congress p
in an election held in year t.
We examine the relation between congressional members’ reelection prospects and local
stewardship in Table 8, as follows:
Share_Congressp,t = α + β1Wtd_Stewardshipp,t−1 + β2PolRepXp,t−1
+β3Wtd_Controlsp,t−1 + βt + εp,t
(3)
Wtd_Stewardshipp,t-1 is the population-weighted average of the stewardship of all local
governments within the constituency of a congressional member p. We measureWtd_Stewardship
based on the financial statements filed immediately preceding the election. We also measure
all other independent variables with a one-period lag from the election date.
Because powerful members of Congress have a greater ability to direct benefits to their
constituencies, we control for congressional power. PolRepXp,t-1 is a proxy for congressional
member p’s power in Congress and is measured as the product of member p’s tenure (in
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We include several control variables that can explain the congressional reelection out-
comes. Wtd_FederalExpp,t-1 and Wtd_Subsidyp,t-1 control for the monetary benefits that
powerful members of Congress bring to their constituencies. We take the population-
weighted average of federal expenditures and corporate subsidies for each election (i.e.,
the state-wide average for Senate elections and the district-wide average for House elec-
tions). We also control for political competition (Wtd_PolCompp,t-1), per-capita income
(Wtd_Incomep,t-1), unemployment (Wtd_Unemploymentp,t-1), and education (Wtd_Educationp,t-1).
Each of these variables is measured at the county level and aggregated by population-
weighting at the state level for Senators and the district level for House members.
Column (1) presents the results of Equation 3 that exclude PolRepX to minimize collinear-
ity concerns. We find no evidence that stewardship is statistically correlated with congres-
sional members’ vote share. A possible reason that voters do not penalize congressional
members for poor local stewardship is that those members transfer benefits to their con-
stituencies in many different forms (i.e., direct allocations to local governments, subsidies to
local area corporations, etc.). Because of the diversity of allocation channels, local misap-
propriation may have little effect on congressional members’ reelection prospects.
We continue to find no relation between reelection outcomes and stewardship when we
include congressional power in Columns (2) through (5). However, the coefficients on Pol-
RepX are consistently positive and statistically significant. We also find that direct federal
fund allocations and local-area corporate subsidies are strongly positively correlated with
congressional election outcomes. In terms of control variables, we find limited evidence of a
link between economic variables and vote share.
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based incentives to demand stewardship from local governments within their electorates and
instead rely on their ability to increase the welfare of their constituents to obtain reelection.
Under the assumption that members of Congress are aware of this, they are unlikely to
demand local governments’ stewardship.
Taken together, the evidence in Tables 6 through 8 shows that local government officials
have election-related incentives to maintain stewardship over public resources. Furthermore,
these incentives relate to local government officials’ reelection prospects but not those of the
congressional members that represent the local area.
5 Conclusion
Local governments play a critical role in citizen welfare because they oversee the provision of
essential services. Members of Congress channel federal resources to their constituencies to
help fund these services. However, federal resources are not equally distributed; prior research
shows that local governments in the constituencies of powerful congressional representatives
receive disproportionately more resources. We study local governments’ stewardship over
public resources. Our findings show that local governments located in the constituencies
of powerful congressional members provide less stewardship. We validate that the negative
relation is casual by using plausibly exogenous departures from Congress.
We also provide initial evidence that local governments’ stewardship over resources is
important to voters’ satisfaction with local officials. In particular, we find that local gov-
ernment stewardship is positively correlated with local officials’ reelection outcomes. By
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ardship demonstrated by local governments within their constituencies.
Our paper extends the literature that examines the consequences of links to powerful
politicians. We provide evidence of an adverse outcome arising from political connections
and shed light on a unique type of “political connection.” A further contribution of our
study is that it provides a novel measure of stewardship that researchers can use for a broad
cross-section of government entities. This audit-based measure facilitates future research at
the local government level, which is often constrained by data availability.
Given the increased interest in the financial health of local governments, our paper pro-
vides timely and novel insights into the factors that influence local governments’ stewardship
efforts. Overall, our evidence shows that powerful congressional representation weakens local
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Appendix A: Definitions of variables
Variable Definition
Bond Bondg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government g issues a new
municipal bond in year t.
CongressRepX CongressRepXg,t-1 is the sum of PolRepXp,t-1 for the three members of
Congress (two Senators and a House Representative) that represent
the area in which local government g is located, divided by 100. For
each member of Congress, p, PolRepXp,t-1 is the product of the
member’s tenure in Congress (in years) and the number of Top X
committees on which the member sits in year t-1. X is set to one of
the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees.
Court Cases Court Casesc is the number of civil and criminal court cases (in
thousands) in county c’s U.S Court District from 1998 to 2017.
DepartX DepartXg,t-4 to t-1 is an indicator equal to one if a member of Congress,
who represents the local area in which local government g is located,
serving on a TopX congressional committee unexpectedly dies or is
appointed to a cabinet position between years t-4 and t-1. X is set to
one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees.
DOJ Enforcements DOJ Enforcementsc is the number of federal, state, and local public
officials convicted of a corruption-related crime in county c’s U.S.
Court District from 1998 to 2017.
Education Educationc is the average percentage of the adult population in county
c over the period 2013 to 2017 that has a four-year university degree.
FederalExp FederalExpg,t is the natural logarithm of directly-allocated federal
funds expended by local government g in year t.
Income Incomec,t is the natural logarithm of county c’s per-capita income in
year t.
No_NonCompliance No_NonComplianceg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government
g ’s auditor does not identify material noncompliance with laws or
regulations in their audit of the year t financial statements, and zero
otherwise.
No_ModOpinion No_ModOpiniong,t is an indicator equal to one if local government g ’s
auditor provides an unmodified audit opinion (i.e., no adverse opinion,
disclaimer of opinion, or qualified opinion) on the year t financial
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No_MatWeakness No_MatWeaknessg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government
g ’s auditor does not identify a material weakness in the internal
controls over the year t financial statements, and zero otherwise.
No_SigDeficiency No_SigDeficiencyg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government
g ’s auditor does not identify a significant deficiency in internal
controls over the year t financial statements, and zero otherwise.
PolComp PolCompc,t is an indicator equal to one if county c’s vote count for
the Democratic candidate is within one percent of the vote count for
the Republican candidate in the next senatorial election.
Share_Congress Share_Congressp,t is the proportion of votes won by the incumbent
member of Congress p in an election held in year t.
Share_Local Share_Localp,g,t is the proportion of votes won by the incumbent local
official p, who is part of local government g, in an election held in year
t.
Small Smallc,t is an indicator equal to one if county c is in the lowest
population quartile in year t.
Stewardship Stewardshipg,t is the first principal component of the following five
outcomes from the audit of local government g ’s year t financial
statements: an unmodified audit opinion; no material weakness; no
significant deficiency; no material noncompliance; the lag between
period-end and the audit report date, multiplied by negative one.
Subsidy Subsidyg,t is the natural logarithm of federal subsidies to corporations
headquartered within the jurisdiction of local government g in year t.
Timeliness Timelinessg,t is the number of days between the date local government
g ’s auditor signed the year t audit report and the fiscal year-ending
date, divided by 365 and multiplied by negative one so that higher
numbers represent timelier reports.
Unemployment Unemploymentc,t is the percentage of the working population in













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Appendix B: Description of the Single Audit and Sample Schedule of Findings and
Questioned Costs
The Single Audit is comprised of two components: a financial statement audit and a com-
pliance audit. The financial statement audit is analogous to an audit for a publicly-listed
corporation and includes an examination of the financial statements, accompanying notes,
and internal control systems. The compliance audit focuses on the local government’s use of
direct federal fund allocations. The compliance audit specifically evaluates whether the us-
age of the funds is consistent with the conditions underlying the allocations and is compliant
with applicable laws and regulations.
Before executing the Single Audit, the auditor must evaluate the local government and
identify it as a high-risk or low-risk auditee. For high-risk (low-risk) local governments, the
auditor is required to audit at least 40 percent (20 percent) of all the federal assistance
received during the year. Upon completion of the audit, the auditor provides the local
government with opinions on both types of audits and a summary of the findings.
Below, we provide a sample schedule of the auditor’s findings and questioned costs. The
auditors issued unmodified financial statement and compliance audit opinions for the county
of Johnson, Iowa in 2016. However, the auditors identified a material weakness in internal
controls over financial reporting. They go on to explain the nature, the cause, and the effect
of the weakness and provide recommendations for remediation. The county also responds to
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Appendix D: Example of CongressRepX Calculation
The county of Shelby is located in Alabama’s 6th congressional district. In 2004, the House
representative for Alabama’s 6th district (Congressman Spencer Bachus) served on three
committees (Judiciary, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Financial Services) of which
only the first two are on the list of the 10 most powerful committees. As of 2004, Congressman
Bachus served in the House for 12 years. Similarly, Alabama’s Senators, Jeffrey Sessions
and Richard C. Shelby served on three and one, respectively, of the top 10 most powerful
Senate committees and served in the Senate for 7 and 17 years respectively. The value of
CongressRep10 for Shelby county in 2004 represents the aggregate years of service on the
most powerful congressional committees (12*2 + 7*3 + 17*1 = 62). We divide this value by
100 for ease of interpretation in relation to the dependent variables.
To illustrate the calculation further, we calculate CongressRep3 for Shelby County. Of
the three committees on which Congressman Spencer Bachus served, none are on the list
of the three most powerful committees. Senators Jeffrey Sessions and Richard C. Shelby
serve on none and one of the top 3 most powerful Senate committees respectively. The value
of CongressRep3 for Shelby county in 2004 is 17, which represents the aggregate years of
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A presents summary statistics that describe the variables used in the study for our
sample of 56,042 local-government observations. Panel B presents Pearson product-moment
correlations among the main variables used in the study. All variables are defined in Ap-
pendix A.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl
Stewardship 0.00 1.36 -0.63 0.47 1.07
No_ModOpinion 0.88 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00
No_MatWeakness 0.76 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00
No_SigDeficiency 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
No_NonCompliance 0.91 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00
Timeliness -0.71 0.40 -0.75 -0.64 -0.51
CongressRep1 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11
CongressRep3 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.30
CongressRep5 0.33 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.44
CongressRep10 0.63 0.40 0.34 0.56 0.83
Depart1 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Depart3 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Depart5 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
Depart10 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bond 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
FederalExp 8.13 1.43 7.03 7.89 8.93
Subsidy 0.93 2.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
Court Cases 92.63 76.12 41.11 66.10 122.58
DOJ Enforcements 226.29 193.26 88.00 136.00 337.00
Small 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
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Table 2: Local Stewardship, by State
This table presents the mean level of Stewardship across the local governments within each
state and is ordered from highest to lowest stewardship. Stewardshipg,t is the first principal
component of the following five outcomes from the audit of local government g ’s year t
financial statements: an unmodified audit opinion; no material weakness; no significant
deficiency; no material noncompliance; the lag between period-end and the audit report
date, multiplied by negative one.
Mean Mean
State Obs Stewardship State Obs Stewardship
Washington 1,458 0.72 Arkansas 435 0.07
Oregon 968 0.64 Arizona 891 0.06
Delaware 131 0.63 Wyoming 425 0.04
Colorado 1,267 0.61 Alabama 1,064 -0.01
Utah 520 0.60 South Dakota 217 -0.02
New Hamphsire 254 0.55 Massachussetts 871 -0.03
Idaho 461 0.54 Nebraska 392 -0.06
Virginia 2,260 0.52 Kentucky 701 -0.16
Maryland 673 0.50 Illinois 1,884 -0.17
Texas 2,648 0.50 Minnesota 2,029 -0.19
Florida 2,586 0.42 Ohio 2,390 -0.19
Alaska 582 0.41 Georgia 1,268 -0.25
North Carolina 2,196 0.39 Rhode Island 133 -0.26
California 5,086 0.37 New Jersey 724 -0.29
Kansas 711 0.25 Vermont 150 -0.42
Connecticut 307 0.23 Iowa 1,297 -0.49
Mane 361 0.22 Louisiana 1,099 -0.50
North Dakota 482 0.17 Oklahoma 517 -0.67
Nevada 390 0.17 Indiana 1,522 -0.78
Hawaii 68 0.16 Montana 563 -0.82
South Carolina 829 0.15 Pennsylvania 1,685 -0.82
New York 2,118 0.15 New Mexico 615 -0.88
Wisconsin 1,748 0.13 Mississippi 1,072 -1.05
Missouri 1,103 0.09 Tennessee 2,235 -1.24
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Table 3: Local Stewardship and Congressional Representation
This table examines the relation between local stewardship and the power of congressional
representation, as follows:
Stewardshipg,t = α + β1CongressRepXg,t−1 + β2Bondg,t + β3FederalExpg,t
+β4Subsidyg,t + βg + βt + εg,t
The dependent variable in Panel A, Stewardshipg,t, is the first principal component of five
outcomes from the audit of local government g ’s year t financial statements. The depen-
dent variables in Panel B are the five components of Stewardship individually. These in-
clude: No_ModOpinion in Columns (1) and (2), No_MatWeakness in Columns (3) and
(4), No_SigDeficiency in Columns (5) and (6), No_NonCompliance in Columns (7) and
(8), and Timeliness in Columns (9) and (10). These variables are defined in Appendix A.
CongressRepXg,t-1 is the sum of PolRepXp,t-1 for the three members of Congress (two Sen-
ators and a House Representative) that represent the area in which local government g is
located, divided by 100. For each member of Congress, p, PolRepXp,t-1 is the product of the
member’s tenure in Congress (in years) and the number of Top X committees on which the
member sits in year t-1. X is set to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees.
Bondg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government g issues a new municipal bond in
year t. FederalExpg,t is the natural logarithm of directly-allocated federal funds expended by
local government g in year t. Subsidyg,t is the natural logarithm of federal subsidies to cor-
porations headquartered within the jurisdiction of local government g in year t. We include
local government fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Robust standard
errors, clustered by congressional district, are reported in parentheses. One, two, and three
stars indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level
of statistical significance (two-tailed), respectively.
Panel A: Stewardship









Bond 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
FederalExp -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Subsidy -0.018** -0.020** -0.017** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Gov’t FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 56,042 56,042 56,042 56,042
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Table 4: Plausibly Exogenous Variation in the Power of Congressional Representation
This table examines the relation between local stewardship and plausibly exogenous declines
in the power of congressional representation, as follows:
Stewardshipg,t = α + β1DepartXg,t−4 to t−1 + β2Bondg,t + β3FederalExpg,t
+β4Subsidyg,t + βg + βt + εg,t
Stewardshipg,t is the first principal component of the following five outcomes from the audit
of local government g ’s year t financial statements: an unmodified audit opinion; no material
weakness; no significant deficiency; no material noncompliance; the lag between period-end
and the audit report date, multiplied by negative one. DepartXg,t-4 to t-1 is an indicator equal
to one if a member of Congress, who represents the local area in which local government
g is located, serving on a TopX congressional committee unexpectedly dies or is appointed
to a cabinet position between years t-4 and t-1. X is set to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most
powerful committees. Bondg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government g issues a new
municipal bond in year t. FederalExpg,t is the natural logarithm of directly-allocated federal
funds expended by local government g in year t. Subsidyg,t is the natural logarithm of federal
subsidies to corporations headquartered within the jurisdiction of local government g in year
t. We include local government fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Robust
standard errors, clustered by congressional district, are reported in parentheses. One, two,
and three stars indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%,
and 1% level of statistical significance (two-tailed), respectively.










Bond 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
FederalExp -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Subsidy -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Gov’t FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 56,042 56,042 56,042 56,042
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Table 5: Misappropriation or Ineptitude?
This table examines whether the negative relation between local stewardship and the power
of congressional representation is consistent with misappropriation or ineptitude, as follows:
Stewardshipg,t = α + β1CongressRepXg,t−1 + β2CongressRepXg,t−1 ∗ V arc + β3V arc
+β4Bondg,t + β5FederalExpg,t + β6Subsidyg,t + βg + βt + εg,t
Stewardshipg,t is the first principal component of the following five outcomes from the audit
of local government g ’s year t financial statements: an unmodified audit opinion; no material
weakness; no significant deficiency; no material noncompliance; the lag between period-end
and the audit report date, multiplied by negative one. CongressRepXg,t-1 is the sum of
PolRepXp,t-1 for the three members of Congress (two Senators and a House Representative)
that represent the area in which local government g is located, divided by 100. For each
member of Congress, p, PolRepXp,t-1 is the product of the member’s tenure in Congress (in
years) and the number of Top X committees on which the member sits in year t-1. X is
set to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees. In Panel A, Var is equal to
LowCorruptc, an indicator equal to one if county c is in a the lowest quartile of each of
two corruption variables. In Columns (1) and (2), Court Casesc is the number of civil and
criminal court cases (in thousands) in county c’s U.S Court District from 1998 to 2017. In
Columns (3) and (4), DOJ Enforcementsc is the number of federal, state, and local public
officials convicted of a corruption-related crime in county c’s U.S. Court District from 1998
to 2017. In Panel B, Var is equal to Smallc, an indicator equal to one if county c is in the
lowest population quartile in year t. Bondg,t is an indicator equal to one if local government
g issues a new municipal bond in year t. FederalExpg,t is the natural logarithm of directly-
allocated federal funds expended by local government g in year t. Subsidyg,t is the natural
logarithm of federal subsidies to corporations headquartered within the jurisdiction of local
government g in year t. We include local government fixed effects and year fixed effects in
all specifications. Robust standard errors, clustered by congressional district, are reported
in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate that the estimated coefficient is different
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Table 5, continued
Panel B: Ineptitude


















Small 0.006 -0.067 -0.085 -0.125**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.052) (0.055)
Bond 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
FederalExp -0.012 -0.08 -0.009 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Subsidy -0.018** -0.020** -0.018** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
CongressRepX+CongressRepX*Small -0.742 -0.336 -0.084 -0.070
P-Value: CongressRepX+CongressRepX*Small=0 0.009 0.012 0.354 0.177
Gov’t FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 56,042 56,042 56,042 56,042
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Table 6: Political Competition
This table examines whether the relation between local stewardship and the power of con-
gressional representation is moderated by political competition, as follows:
Stewardshipg,t = α + β1CongressRepXg,t−1 + β2CongressRepXg,t−1 ∗ PolCompc,t
+β3PolCompc,t + β4Bondg,t + β5FederalExpg,t + β6Subsidyg,t + βg + βt + εg,t
Stewardshipg,t is the first principal component of the following five outcomes from the audit
of local government g ’s year t financial statements: an unmodified audit opinion; no material
weakness; no significant deficiency; no material noncompliance; the lag between period-end
and the audit report date, multiplied by negative one. CongressRepXg,t-1 is the sum of
PolRepXp,t-1 for the three members of Congress (two Senators and a House Representative)
that represent the area in which local government g is located, divided by 100. For each
member of Congress, p, PolRepXp,t-1 is the product of the member’s tenure in Congress (in
years) and the number of Top X committees on which the member sits in year t-1. X is set
to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees. PolCompc,t is an indicator equal to
one if county c’s vote count for the Democratic candidate is within one percent of the vote
count for the Republican candidate in the next senatorial election. Bondg,t is an indicator
equal to one if local government g issues a new municipal bond in year t. FederalExpg,t is
the natural logarithm of directly-allocated federal funds expended by local government g in
year t. Subsidyg,t is the natural logarithm of federal subsidies to corporations headquartered
within the jurisdiction of local government g in year t. We include local government fixed
effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Robust standard errors, clustered by
congressional district, are reported in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate that
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Table 7: Local Elections and Stewardship
Panel A presents the summary statistics that describe the variables used to study our sam-
ple of 1,550 local elections. Panel B presents regression results that examine the relation
between the success of local officials’ reelection campaigns, their stewardship, and the power
of congressional representation, as follows:
Share_Localp,g,t = α + β1Reported_Stewardshipp,t−1 + β2CongressRepXp,t−1
+β3FederalExpp,t−1 + β4Subsidyp,t−1 + β5PolCompp,t−1
+β6Incomep,t−1 + β7Unemploymentp,t−1 + β8Educationp + βt−1 + εp,t−1
Share_Localp,t measures the proportion of votes won by the incumbent local official, p, out
of the total number of votes cast in year t. Reported_Stewardshipg,t-1 is local government g ’s
Stewardship reported in the financial statements filed in the 12-month period immediately
preceding local official p’s election in year t. Stewardship is the first principal component
of the following five variables found in the financial statement audit report: an unmodified
audit opinion; no material weakness; no significant deficiency; no material noncompliance;
and the lag between period end and the audit report date, multiplied by negative one.
CongressRepXg,t-1 is the sum of PolRepXp,t-1 for the three members of Congress (two Senators
and a House Representative) that represent the area in which local government g is located,
divided by 100. For each member of Congress, p, PolRepXp,t-1 is the product of the member’s
tenure in Congress (in years) and the number of Top X committees on which the member sits
in year t-1. X is set to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees. FederalExpg,t is
the natural logarithm of directly-allocated federal funds expended by local government g in
year t. Subsidyg,t is the natural logarithm of federal subsidies to corporations headquartered
within the jurisdiction of local government g in year t. PolCompc,t is an indicator equal to
one if county c’s vote count for the Democratic candidate is within one percent of the vote
count for the Republican candidate in the next senatorial election. Incomec,t is the natural
logarithm of county c’s per-capita income in year t. Unemploymentc,t is the percentage of
the working population in county c that is unemployed in year t. Educationc is the average
percentage of the adult population in county c over the period 2013 to 2017 that has a four-
year university degree. We include year fixed effects in all columns. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate that the estimated coefficient
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Table 7, continued
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl
Share_Local 0.63 0.20 0.53 0.60 0.75
Reported_Stewardship 0.31 1.11 -0.21 0.97 1.10
CongressRep1 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.11
CongressRep3 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.31
CongressRep5 0.33 0.19 0.19 0.31 0.43
CongressRep10 0.66 0.36 0.39 0.61 0.90
FederalExp 9.35 1.39 8.28 9.45 10.39
Subsidy 0.49 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.07
PolComp 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income 10.66 0.29 10.47 10.66 10.84
Unemployment 5.98 2.25 4.30 5.40 7.10
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Table 7, continued
Panel B: Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share_local
Reported_Stewardship 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009**









FederalExp 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Subsidy 0.018** 0.018** 0.015** 0.016** 0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PolComp -0.071 -0.062 -0.080* -0.076* -0.071
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Income -0.186*** -0.192*** -0.185*** -0.191*** -0.187***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Unemployment -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550
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Table 8: Congressional Elections and Stewardship
Panel A presents the summary statistics that describe the variables used to study our sample
of 2,780 congressional elections. Panel B presents the regression results that examine the
relation between the success of congressional members’ reelection campaigns, their congres-
sional power, and the connected local governments’ stewardship, as follows:
Share_Congressp,t = α + β1Wtd_Stewardshipp,t−1 + β2PolRepXp,t−1
+β3Wtd_FederalExpp,t−1 + β4Wtd_Subsidyp,t−1 + β5Wtd_PolCompp,t−1
+β6Wtd_Incomep,t−1 + β7Wtd_Unemploymentp,t−1 + β8Wtd_Educationp + βt−1 + εp,t−1
Share_Congressp,t is the proportion of votes won by the incumbent member of Congress p in
an election held in year t. Wtd_Stewardshipp,t-1 is the average Stewardship of the financial
statements filed in the 12-month period immediately preceding member p’s election in year t,
weighted by population, of all local governments g in congressional member p’s jurisdiction.
Stewardship is the first principal component of the following five variables found in local
government g ’s financial statement audit report: an unmodified audit opinion; no material
weakness; no significant deficiency; no material noncompliance; and the lag between period
end and the audit report date, multiplied by negative one. PolRepXp,t-1 is the product of
congressional member p’s tenure in Congress (in years) and the number of Top X commit-
tees the member sits on. X is set to one of the 1, 3, 5, or 10 most powerful committees.
Wtd_FederalExpp,t-1 is the average FederalExp, weighted by population, of all local govern-
ments g in congressional member p’s jurisdiction in year t-1. Wtd_Subsidyp,t-1 is the average
Subsidy, weighted by population, of all local governments g in congressional member p’s juris-
diction in year t-1. Wtd_PolCompp,t-1 is the average PolComp, weighted by population, of all
counties c in congressional member p’s jurisdiction in year t-1. Wtd_Incomep,t-1 is the aver-
age Income, weighted by population, of all counties c in congressional member p’s jurisdiction
in year t-1. Wtd_Unemploymentp,t-1 is the average Unemployment, weighted by population,
of all counties c in congressional member p’s jurisdiction in year t-1. Wtd_Educationp is the
average Education, weighted by population, of all counties c in congressional member p’s ju-
risdiction. We include year fixed effects in all columns. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate that the estimated coefficient is different
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Table 8, continued
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl
Share_Congress 0.66 0.13 0.58 0.65 0.72
Wtd_Stewardship 0.12 0.74 -0.25 0.25 0.66
PolRep1 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
PolRep3 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.12
PolRep5 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.12
PolRep10 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.18
Wtd_FederalExp 8.50 1.25 7.67 8.26 8.98
Wtd_Subsidy 0.51 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.24
Wtd_PolComp 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wtd_Income 10.55 0.27 10.36 10.52 10.71
Wtd_Unemployment 6.50 2.29 4.84 5.98 7.77
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Table 8, continued
Panel B: Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share_Congress
Wtd_Stewardship -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004









Wtd_FederalExp 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wtd_Subsidy 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Wtd_PolComp -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Wtd_Income 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Wtd_Unemployment -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wtd_Education -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
R-squared 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033
59
